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A PERSONAL WORD 
Francis Cooke QC 
I am very pleased to accept the Editors' invitation to contribute to this issue of the Law Review. 
It provides me with an opportunity to record some thoughts on a man who has hugely influenced my 
life. There are, however, some difficulties. One is in striking the right balance between a personal 
contribution and an article worthy of publication in a distinguished Law Review. Another is the 
desirability of the son not overdoing the praise of his famous father. But the reader will, I hope, 
excuse some personal content, and it may not be completely out of place in this publication to be 
complimentary. So, in an attempt to provide something of value notwithstanding these difficulties, I 
will endeavour to describe a personal attribute of my father, and illustrate how it influenced his 
approach to legal problems, and to judging. 
To say my father had a love of words is an understatement. He was, in fact, completely 
fascinated by them. Whether he was stroking his sideburns (mid 70s), gnawing his handkerchief 
(80s and 90s) or simply sitting with closed eyes (throughout), it was words, and the ideas they 
conveyed, that were completely occupying him. The product of the concentration could sometimes 
be devastating. For counsel an argument could be crushed, or taken beyond wildest dreams. At 
home the same approach could result in a sparkling joke, or an insight into another's personality. In 
either environment the ability to express ideas with an attractive use of language could capture the 
listener. His use of words made what he said, or wrote, more attractive, and therefore persuasive. 
The verbal formulations seemed almost impossible to contradict. His carefully crafted sentences 
could be both authoritative and highly entertaining. 
Any need for proof of this obsession with words, and with meanings, can be found in my father's 
pursuits outside of the law. He had a love of great literature, but above all of Shakespeare. And here 
it was partly Shakespeare's use of language and of double meanings that attracted him. There would 
always be a pocket version of one of the plays tucked into a jacket pocket. My visits to Stratford-
upon-Avon with my parents will remain among the fondest of memories. Equally, cryptic 
crosswords, particularly those appearing in The Times, were a favourite pastime. It would be almost 
impossible not to find some crossword on the go. With cryptic crosswords it was the word play, and 
the more overt double meanings that appealed. Imagine my father's excitement when he began doing 
The Times cryptic crossword one morning shortly before his fourth Hamlyn lecture to find that the 
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answers to at least seven of the clues were direct references to his upcoming lecture.1 He was very 
proud of once winning The Times cryptic crossword competition, and the prize (an atlas of the 
world) is one of the family's treasured possessions. 
In many ways the attributes I have described are more closely associated with the skills of an 
advocate, rather than those of a judge. This was something of which he was conscious. He once 
identified his father, the more orthodox lawyer, as better suited to the judicial role and there do 
appear to have been important differences between their approaches. For RB Cooke "a few careful 
and concise but forceful submissions … sometimes alter the result of a case. Sometimes even a 
single striking sentence does the trick".2 On the other hand PB Cooke saw "all kinds of possibilities 
in a case, and on occasion a Judge would think that [his] argument was overladened".3 But the 
advocate's skill is not necessarily inconsistent with the judicial function. That is not just because a 
powerful judgment can involve the advocacy of new ideas. The ability to recognise how words 
persuade not only leads to legal propositions being put in an effective way, but enables the 
identification of situations where words are obscuring underlying principle, and disguising the right 
answer. An analysis of my father's judicial and extra-judicial work demonstrates that he was 
frequently concerned with attempts to explain why particular verbal formulations which had become 
reasonably well settled were hiding rather than exposing the underlying principle. 
I AN UNREASONABLE TEST 
The best example of this point is Wednesbury unreasonableness.4 In this case Lord Greene MR 
indicated that a court could interfere by way of judicial review if the decision-making authority 
came "to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it".5 
Thus was borne a phrase that has stayed in the mind of lawyers since that time. Indeed, arguably it is 
the most well known judicial review phrase for lawyers in New Zealand and the United Kingdom – 
it has stuck in the collective conscious. It is doubtful, however, that Lord Greene was aware that he 
was making his most famous judicial utterance. The judgment records that he felt the decision did 
not require reference to authority, and it would seem that the defendant's counsel was not called 
  
1  See the reference in Lord Cooke of Thorndon Turning Points of the Common Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1997) 63. 
2  "Court of Appeal President: An interview with Sir Robin Cooke" (1986) NZLJ 170, 173. 
3  A slightly adverse comment in an otherwise positive assessment by Sir David Smith in R B Cooke (ed) 
Portrait of a Profession: The Centennial Book of the New Zealand Law Society (AH & AW Reed, 
Wellington, 1969) 131. Interestingly the same work describes FH Cooke, one generation further back, as 
having "… the faculty of presenting the facts of the case, and the necessary applicable law, in the minimum 
of words" (326). 
4  Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA). 
5  Ibid, 234 Lord Greene MR. 
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upon.6 Nevertheless it is a famous decision, and a famous phrase, and the case is described by some 
as one of the "bedrocks of our modern administrative law".7 But it was the dicta that my father most 
disliked. 
This dislike was most evident from his extra judicial writings. He described the test as "a 
distracting circumlocution".8 As a test it did little more than reinforce the need for judicial 
deference. The court was being reminded that it should be slow to substitute its views on the merits 
for those of the body charged with the decision making exercise. But it did little more than provide 
an indirect reminder of this need – there is nothing in the words that provide any direct content. It is 
a verbal expression of an almost emotional nature. Neither is there any appreciation that the nature 
of judicial deference will ultimately depend on the legal subject matter.  
My father saw no need to be reminded of the concept of judicial deference by a kind of verbal 
trick. Judicial deference was appropriately considered directly. The function of the court is to ensure 
that the decision making body has made a decision reasonably open to it given the power that it has 
been given. By focussing simply on what is reasonably open to the deciding body, the emphasis is 
squarely on the court's function – that is to ensure a decision is made in accordance with law. If 
anything, the Wednesbury formulation suggests judicial review has something to do with the court's 
personal views on a topic, with the court being permitted to interfere when the judge finds the 
decision highly disagreeable. The judicial review exercise has nothing to do with the judge's 
personal views on the subject matter. The verbal formulation is thereby potentially misleading. In 
one paper, my father described his view in the following way:9 
Lastly I come back to reasonableness: the merits, substance, how far will the courts go? … Let it be 
clear that no one, anywhere, suggests that the courts can substitute their discretion for that of the 
administrative authority, or intrude into policy formation and application where the policy is consistent 
with statute. Even the administrator's view of the facts is at least highly likely to be accepted if 
reasonably open: for it is doubtful whether the concept of jurisdictional fact has validity any longer. The 
concern is to check that the decision of the Minister or other authority is one that could reasonably be 
reached on the facts and in the light of the relevant law. It is no severe test; to refrain from insisting even 
on compliance with this generous test would be to abandon proper judicial responsibility. Often lawyers 
  
6  See the comments of Sir John Laws "Wednesbury" in Christopher Forsyth and Ivan Hare (eds) The Golden 
Metwand and the Crooked Cord, Essays on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1998) 185. 
7  Ibid, 186. 
8  Sir Robin Cooke "The Struggle for Simplicity in Administrative Law" in M Taggart (ed) Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action in the 1980s (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1986) 14-15. 
9  Sir Robin Cooke "Administrative Law Trends in the Commonwealth" in Visu Sinnadurai (ed) The Sultan 
Azlan Shah Law Lectures: Judges on the Common Law (Thompson Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 
2004) 105, 128. 
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round the world speak of Wednesbury unreasonableness. I venture to think that there is nothing arcane 
or special about the subject requiring the geographical epithet. The duty is simply to act reasonably, that 
is to say in accordance with reason. 
In a later paper more directly focussing on Wednesbury, he said this:10 
Lord Greene's Wednesbury criteria require the administrative authority to direct itself properly in law. 
Greater attention to that requirement might even compensate to a significant extent for the weakness of 
the unreasonableness criterion as formulated by Lord Greene. Not infrequently a decision subject to 
judicial review may be one which a reasonable authority could take, looking at the subject-matter in the 
abstract and without regard to the authorising statute. The Wednesbury case itself might have been in 
that category. The condition there in question prohibited the attendance of children under 15 at cinemas 
on Sundays, making no exception for children accompanied by their parents. To some perfectly 
reasonably people that degree of paternalism on the part of the local council might seem sensible rather 
than patronising; whereas it is far from self-evident that the Act prescribing the cinema licensing power 
ought to have been construed as authorising the local authority to (in effect) supplant the prerogative of 
parents. If film-going parents with children under 15 constituted a special community hazard in 
Wednesbury, the court was entitled to evidence to that effect. 
Some comments were a little more critical. In the same paper he observed that "Lord Greene 
was a most gifted Judge; in this instance the masterly and authoritative manner of his judgment may 
have tended to obscure what can now be seen as the superficiality of some of the matter",11 and he 
ended another paper by saying "by and large administrative law is on the right road, as is shown by 
the fact that until now, at the very end, this lecture has required not a single utterance of word 
Wednesbury".12  
Judicial discipline prevented any of these more pointed remarks appearing in a judgment. In 
Webster v Auckland Harbour Board he had observed that "unvarnished adherence" to 
unreasonableness in its ordinary sense avoided the difficulties caused by the semantics inherent in 
the "Wednesbury" test,13 but it was fairly late in the piece that he made the most critical comments 
about Wednesbury in a decision of the House of Lords. He once told me that he particularly enjoyed 
his judicial period in the United Kingdom because he did not feel the same responsibility to provide 
judgments as he had as President of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, and felt he only needed to 
  
10  Sir Robin Cooke "Damnosa Hereditas" in Judicial Review An International Perspective, Liber Amicorum in 
Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley (Kluwer Law International, London, 2000) Vol 2, 237, 240. 
11  Ibid, 237. 
12  Sir Robin Cooke "The Road Ahead for the Common Law" (Commonwealth Lecture, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, October 2003). 
13  Webster v Auckland Harbour Board [1987] 2 NZLR 129, 132 (CA) Cooke P. 
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write a judgment when he truly felt he could make a contribution. It is likely that he would have 
included R (Daly) v Home Secretary14 in that category. Here he said:15 
The other matter concerns degrees of judicial review. Lord Steyn illuminates the distinction between 
'traditional' (that is to say in terms of English case law, Wednesbury) standards of judicial review and 
higher standards under the European Convention or the common law of human rights. As he indicates, 
often the results are the same. But the view that the standards are substantially the same appears to have 
received its quietus in Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493 and Lustig-Prean and 
Beckett v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 548. And I think that the day will come when it will be 
more widely recognised that Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 
KB 223 was an unfortunately retrogressive decision in English administrative law, in so far as it 
suggested that there are degrees of unreasonableness and that only a very extreme degree can bring an 
administrative decision within the legitimate scope of judicial invalidation. The depth of judicial review 
and the deference due to administrative discretion vary with the subject matter. It may well be, however, 
that the law can never be satisfied in any administrative field merely by a finding that the decision under 
review is not capricious or absurd. 
The reader will have noticed that the son has found his father's views agreeable ones. But the 
agreement may not be complete. To the extent that cases such as Daly endorse the idea that the 
intensity of judicial review should overtly change with the subject matter, the son may depart 
company. There is no such thing as degrees of illegality. The idea that in some cases a court tries 
harder to see if there is any unlawfulness seems inconsistent with the judicial function. It is apparent 
that in some cases courts will be better placed to identify illegality because of the subject matter. In 
the area of human rights, for example, the courts have the expertise to identify the legal limits of 
executive action. There is no need for any deference. Moreover, the importance of such fundamental 
rights may simply arise from the correct interpretation of the law, rather than from the adoption of 
more "intense" scrutiny. Even in quite technical areas, where the specialisation of the deciding body 
seems to be important, the statute may still require the court itself to descend into the technical 
detail, the merits if you like, to make sure the law is being applied.16 Notions of intensity simply 
obscure the real task, which is to ensure the law is being followed. 
  
14  R (Daly) v Home Secretary [2001] 2 AC 532 (HL). See also R v Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte 
International Traders Ferry Ltd [1999] 1 All ER 129, 157, where the test is described as an "admonitory 
circumlocution". 
15  Ibid, 549 Lord Cooke. 
16  So, for example, the Court of Appeal in Squid Fishery Management Co Ltd v Minister of Fisheries (13 July 
2004) CA 39/04 Hammond, William Young and O'Regan J set aside a decision on sea lion mortality rates in 
the squid fishery because the scientific model used by the Minister's advisers did not conform with the 
information requirements of the Fisheries Act 1996. 
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As a practitioner in the area, it has become apparent that it is very fashionable to have a debate 
in each judicial review case on what the standard of review is. This seems to be a further distraction 
in an area where simplicity should be the objective. This is, after all, the "struggle".17 But I digress, 
and in any event it is not altogether clear that my father directly endorsed the intensity of review 
concept, rather than welcoming any new path that helped the courts get out of the Wednesbury rut. 
He did tend to have the longer term in mind. 
II OTHER VERBAL DISTRACTIONS 
The linguistic sins of the law were not limited to Wednesbury unreasonableness. There were 
many other examples where my father thought that the words were getting in the way of a true 
understanding of principle. That was not limited to the field of judicial review, although in that area 
in particular much of the jurisprudence seems to be devoted to the creation of categories with 
particular labels, followed by endless debate on what they really mean. It is frightening to think how 
much intellectual time has been spent around the common law world by people exploring the 
concept of "nullity", or debating the difference between what is "void" or what is "voidable".18 
Once it was established that judicial review was available "on the face of the record", we agonised 
on what the record was.19 My father was not the first or the only advocate of the abandonment of 
this masochism. But it was nevertheless his favourite cause. His desire was to "avoid technical and 
apparently exact (yet deceptively so) terms such as void, voidable, nullity, ultra vires. Weight is 
given rather to the seriousness of the error and all the circumstances of the case".20 
In the areas of tort law, and in particular negligence, the desire was to strip away labels that 
could mislead. Thus in his third Hamlyn lecture he dismissed "proximity" as providing any help as a 
guide to the duty of care question – "the term itself is currently much employed but gives no help at 
all in ascertaining whether the courts would regard the relationship as close enough".21 And he felt 
the same about the word "incremental" which he described as "another judicially 'in' word". The use 
of this term involved a "… suggestion that an increment is only a very little addition; but, if so, this 
is as unsound etymologically as it would be if intended to reflect the way in which the common law 
  
17  See the title of Paul Rishworth (ed) The Struggle for Simplicity in the Law: Essays for Lord Cooke of 
Thorndon (Butterworths, Wellington, 1997). 
18  I can't help but noticing Christopher Forsyth's paper in The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord Essays 
on Public Law in Honour of Sir Williams Wade, above n 6, 141 is titled "The Metaphysic of Nullity – 
Invalidity, Conceptual Reasoning and the Rule of Law". He concludes "Nullity … is one of the foundations 
of administrative law". By contrast, my father's paper in the same publication is entitled "The Discretionary 
Heart of Administrative Law" (203). 
19  See GDS Taylor Judicial Review (Butterworths, Wellington, 1991) paras 14.10 -14.11. 
20  AJ Burr Ltd v Blenheim Borough [1980] 2 NZLR 1, 4 (CA) Cooke J. 
21  Robin Cooke "The Temptation of Elegance Resisted" in Turning Points of the Common Law, above n 1, 48, 
54. 
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has been developed …".22 Other examples of this approach can be found in other fields of law – 
indeed in most fields of law that he encountered. 
His critics were minded to say that his approach tended to make the law less certain, as too 
much was left to the individual views of the court, and to judicial discretion. The court's decisions 
were accordingly too difficult to predict. Yet it is far from clear that this is really so, and it certainly 
was not the intention. The whole objective of the struggle for simplicity was to make the law easier 
to understand. The kind of concepts that he rebelled against did not create certainty at all, 
particularly when it was uncertain exactly what they meant, or what the exceptions to them were. 
And the critics may not have properly taken into account that the desire for clear cut and readily 
understandable principles in the commercial law area was part of the goal. Thus the first of the four 
cases he chose in his four Hamlyn lectures as being turning points in the law was Salomon v A 
Salomon & Co Ltd, which recognised the importance of the separate legal personality of 
companies.23 And in fields such as tort, he was of the view that negligence should not create 
confusion by creating remedies that were inconsistent with established common law rules, such as 
those in defamation.24 So the criticism seems unwarranted, or at best needs significant refinement. 
But my main point is to demonstrate how significant the almost obsessive interest in language 
was to my father's approach as a judge. In the end judges are people like everybody else, and their 
personalities will frequently explain their judicial approach. 
III CONSTITUTIONAL MEASURES 
The debates surrounding the sovereignty of Parliament need also to be mentioned in this 
context. The view that "some common law rights presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could 
not override them"25 has been the subject of considerable discussion, and has been a theme of the 
annual Robin Cooke lecture at Victoria University. Whilst some see the view as an undemocratic 
claim for power by the courts, in the end the ambition was to keep each branch within proper 
bounds, including the courts. Words, and the concepts they conveyed were not to be used in an 
attempt to distort the underlying balance. The word "sovereignty" itself derived its meaning from 
judicial interpretation. When the concepts were recorded in the terms of written constitutional 
instruments, my father naturally favoured Lord Wilberforce's instruction to adopt a "generous 
  
22  Ibid, 55. 
23  Ibid, 1 "A Real Thing". A view expressly advanced judicially in Trevor Ivory Ltd v Anderson [1992] 2 
NZLR 517 (CA). 
24  South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 
NZLR 282; Bell Booth Group Ltd v Attorney-General [1989] 3 NZLR 148. Compare Spring v Guardian 
Assurance PLC [1995] 2 AC 296. 
25  Taylor v NZ Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394 at 398. 
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interpretation avoiding what has been called 'the austerity of tabulated legalism'",26 which he 
described as a statement "now evidently destined for judicial immortality".27 But whilst disliking 
technical or pedantic interpretations, he also disliked complex interpretations that departed from the 
natural meaning of the words, even if employed to advance the power of the courts in relation to the 
executive.  
His views on issues affecting the Indian Constitution illustrate the true philosophy, as well as the 
personal attributes that I have been seeking to describe. In three cases the Indian Supreme Court 
addressed the question of the powers of the Indian Government in relation to the appointment of 
Judges. In the second such case JS Verma J, for a majority of five Judges, quoted Isabella's plea in 
Shakespeare's Measure for Measure to justify an interpretation giving greater power to the court:28 
O, it is excellent 
To have a giant's strength, but it is tyrannous 
To use it like a giant. 
Thus absolute, or sovereign, power of the executive was resisted. But my father was not 
persuaded, and the reference to Shakespeare was irresistible. He thought that the court had used 
artificial interpretive techniques, and in an article entitled "Making the Angels Weep" referred to 
another section of Isabella's speech to make his point:29 
But man, proud man, 
Dressed in a little brief authority, 
… 
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven 
As makes the angels weep … 
He made the point more directly in the following way:30 
It seemed to me, however – as I believe it has seemed to many other lawyers both inside and outside 
India – that the majority judgement, admirably motivated though it was by devotion to the rule of law, 
  
26  Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319, 328.  
27  MOT v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 268. 
28  Supreme Court Advocates-On-Record-Association v Union of India (1994) AIR, SC 268. 
29  Robin Cooke "Making the Angels Weep" in B N Kirpal, Ashok H Desai, Gopal Subramanium, Rajeev 
Dhavan and Raju Ramachandran (eds) Supreme But Not Infallible, Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court 
of India (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 97, 98. 
30  Ibid. 
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made free with the actual provisions of the Constitution. A layman might have felt bewildered by 
something like a sleight of hand… 
In In re Special Reference 1 of 198831 the Indian Supreme Court confronted these interpretative 
issues for a third time, adopting a similar general approach as the second case. And in a further 
article, "Where Angels Fear to Tread" the doubts were now expressed with reference to Alexander 
Pope rather than Shakespeare. He said:32 
All in all, the opinion of the Supreme Court in the third Judges case must be one of the most remarkable 
rulings ever issued by a supreme national appellate court in the common law world. Since, in some 
respects, I have had to voice respectful doubts about the soundness of the constitutional foundations of 
that opinion, let me end on the happier note by saying that my admiration for the Supreme Court in its 
ordinary work, particularly in the field of human rights, is in no way abated. 
A third paper grew the relevant themes together. In presenting his contribution to former Indian 
Attorney-General Soli Sorabjee, he returned to Shakespeare, with the papers title – "How Like an 
Angel" – taken from Hamlet.33 In drawing these themes together he said:34 
Although the contrary became fashionable, particularly because of Dicey, today constitutional scholars 
may increasingly be reluctant to answer current issues by appeals to some doctrine of sovereignty. "The 
sovereignty of Parliament" is to catchphrase beloved of some sections of the media and some politicians; 
incongruously it got into some Supreme Court Act in New Zealand. But it does not survive in-depth 
analysis. In international law there are said to be sovereign states, yet even that concept is gradually 
being undermined by developments such as the European Union and devolution within the United 
Kingdom. Within a national polity the sovereignty concept may be largely replaced by one of 
interaction, of checks and balances, of some degree of competition…. 
And he concluded:35 
Room exists and is utilised for judicial creativeness; but it is balanced by judicial deference to the 
founding charter… 
  
31  In re Special Reference 1 of 1988 (1998) 7 SCC 739. 
32  Robin Cooke "Where Angels Fear to Tread" in Kirpal and others, above n 29, 105. 
33  Robin Cooke "How Like an Angel" in MC Sharma and R Ramachandran Constitutionalism Human Rights 
and the Rule of Law Essays in Honour of Soli J Sorabjee (Universal Law Publishing Co Limited, Delhi, 
2005) 34. 
34  Ibid, 37. 
35  Ibid, 47. 
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The overall truth is that the Constitution contains a melange of powers. No single institution is even 
nearly omnipotent. There is no sovereign. A jurist who search for one would be expending energies idly. 
I think that this will probably always be so in a democracy. 
The three "angel" papers capture both the style and the substance. The law should be interpreted 
in straightforward terms. Words should not be used to disguise true meaning, but to accurately to 
capture it. Even with unwritten constitutions, the key concepts will be expressed in words such as 
"sovereignty", but the very use of such terms should not lead to the principles being obscured. 
IV THE FIRST AND LAST WORDS 
Just over 50 years separate my father's first and last published contributions. Both were to the 
Law Quarterly Review. A comparison of the two articles reveals that his style and ultimate approach 
was unchanged. In the first, the young Cambridge scholar dealt with the conflicting authorities on 
the approach that an appeal court should take to cases where errors had occurred in a criminal trial, 
and whether the trial should be treated as being a nullity.36 In proposing his solution to the issue, he 
sought to find the "single striking sentence" that captured rather than obscured the important 
principle:37 
The authorities in their present state seem to provide no touchstone for determining when an irregularity 
is so serious as to cause mistrial. The extent of the power placed in the hands of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal by the decision of the House of Lords in Crane v Director of Public Prosecutions remains 
obscure; and its clarification must await some decisive and constructive judgment. Perhaps a basis for 
the development of the law may be found simply in a phrase falling from Lord Sumner in the case of 
Crane and echoed by Lord Atkin and Lord Goddard CJ in the cases of Ras Behair Lal and Neal 
respectively. It might be said that an irregularity causes a mistrial if its effect is 'to deprive an accused 
person of the protection given by essential steps in criminal procedure.' In the three cases cited these or 
similar words were used for the immediate purpose of explaining why a conviction must be quashed; but 
possibly they might also be used for the further purpose of explaining when the Court of Criminal 
Appeal may in its discretion order a venire de novo on the ground of mistrial. Such a definition is 
somewhat elastic; but … there are advantages in refraining from great particularity in defining the 
powers of such a court … 
Fifty years later he was not quite so circumspect in suggesting that the answer could be found in 
straightforward language. I recall seeing a draft of his last article, later published in the April 2006 
Law Quarterly Review. It was handwritten, as almost everything he produced was. He was not well, 
but this had not curtailed either his faculties or his abilities. In criticising the House of Lords' 
  
36  Robin Cooke "Venire De Novo" (1955) 71 LQR 100. 
37  Ibid, 128. 
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decision in Jackson v Attorney-General,38 he contended that their Lordships had failed to apply the 
plain meaning of the words of an Act of Parliament. Where the Indian Supreme Court had been too 
bold, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords had been too timid. An Act of 1911 set out a 
procedure that allowed the House of Commons to pass legislation without the consent of the House 
of Lords, and given that the procedure was expressed in conditional language, the procedure had not 
been followed if the conditions were not satisfied – "the point is a straightforward one of ordinary 
statutory construction or interpretation".39 He concluded this article with a passage which 
characterised his ability to use language effectively, and attractively, and with the touch of the 
double meanings that he so enjoyed. They were, and are, appropriate last words:40 
The immediate outcome of Jackson v Attorney-General is not surprising. The controversy generated by 
the Hunting Bill was sharply and deeply divisive, socially and otherwise. To decline to allow the 
majority of the House of Commons to have their way would have been a most daunting step for the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. It would have been open in the media and hence in 
discussion in 'the populace' to misrepresentation as amounting to judicial frustration of the will of the 
elected chamber, rather than to application of the existing constitutional law. I do not suggest that these 
considerations dictated the outcome. Undoubtedly the British courts would not have shrunk from 
invalidating the Hunting Act if they had no reasonable alternative. Fortunately, for public relations, an 
alternative presented itself which can fairly be called reasonable, even if vulnerable for the foregoing 
reasons. 
Discretion is the better part of valour. A retreat may represent wisdom rather than timidity. It is in that 
light that history may well see the case of Jackson. The British Constitution is still one of checks and 
balances. But the balance has been significantly changed, and the checks on the popular assembly as 
constituted for the time have been significantly diminished. Constitutionalism has taken quite a heavy, if 
foreseeable, blow. 
  
38  Jackson v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56. 
39  Robin Cooke "Constitutional Retreat" (2006) 122 LQR 224, 228. 
40  Ibid, 231. 
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